10th International Workshop on the Application of FPGAs in Nuclear Power Plants

FPGA Applications in Life Extension Projects.

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Outline

Examples of 3 Modernization Projects.

1. ESFAS replacement at Kozloduy 5-6
2. Window Annunciator replacement in Safety Systems at Embalse NPPs
3. Addition of an SDS2 trip on low HTS pump RPMs

• Purpose
• Components, architecture and scope of work
• Details
• Equipment Qualification
• Key Factors in the success of the above projects.
Kozloduy NPP. General Information

- Units 1-4 were older VVER units, built in the 70s (1-2) and 80s (3-4). Taken off service between 2004 and 2006

- Units 5 and 6 are VVER-1000. They were constructed 1987 and 1991 respectively.
Purpose for the Refurbishment of Kozloduy 5-6 ESFAS

• Extend the plant life by 30 years and upgrade its generation capacity. ESFAS was implemented using FPGA technology.

• Achieve longer term operability by increasing safety and availability of the plant. The new ESFAS design incorporates self-test and on line diagnostics.
Purpose for the Refurbishment of Kozloduy 5-6 ESFAS

• Conformance with national and international regulations, standards and recommendations
  o standards (IEC 60880, IEC 62138, IEC 61226, IEC 61513, IEC 61508)
  o IAEA standards (IAEA NS-G-1.3, NS-G-1.1, NS-R-1)

• Addressing obsolescence
  o The option chosen for Kozloduy was to adopt FPGA technology as a replacement for their obsolete ESFAS hardware. This would not only solve the immediate obsolescence problems but would also lower the burden posed by future obsolescence issues.
Purpose for the Refurbishment of Kozloduy 5-6 ESFAS

• Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of operation and maintenance activities. This reduces labour costs and frees plant personnel to execute other tasks.
  o Improvements to the Human-Machine interface
  o Automation of periodic testing
  o Incorporation of on line diagnostics.

• Compliance with regulatory requirements
  o Improved the electrical and physical separation between safety divisions
Adoption of FPGA-based Technology. Emphasis:

- **Safety**
  - Compliance with modern international standards to ensure a high degree of reliability
  - Excellent approach to defense-in-depth through diversity

- **Minimization of schedule risks.**
  - Simplicity of design and V&V processes
  - Modularity, standardization and minimization of parts to support Constructability

- **Catering to Obsolescence**
  - Portable applications (HDL) caters to obsolescence

- **Plant Availability**
  - Advanced on-line diagnostics supports Operability and Maintainability
Kozloduy’s ESFAS. Scope of Supply

- Logic Control Module;
- Analog Signals Input Module (0-5 VDC, 0-10 VDC, 0-5 mA, 4-20 mA);
- Normalizing Converter Module for Thermocouple Signals;
- Normalizing Converter Module for RTD Signals;
- Discrete Signals Input Module (Dry Contact > 10 KOhm, 24 VDC);
- Analog Signals Output Module (0-5 VDC, 0-10 VDC, 0-5 mA, 4-20 mA);
- Discrete Signals Output Module (Dry Contact; 0 – 450 VDC, 0 – 450 VAC);
- Actuators Control Module;
- Optic Communication Module;
- Power Supply Modules (AC/DC);
- Chassis and Backplanes;
- Terminal Block, Cable, Wire and Fiber Optic Sets;
- Cabinets.
Kozloduy ESFAS. Equipment Composition

- Normalizing Converter Cabinets (NCC);
- Signal Forming Cabinets (SFC);
- Cross Output Cabinets (COC);
- Remote Control Cabinets (RCC);
- Signaling Cabinets (SC);
- Power Supply Cabinets (PSC);
- Sensor Supply Cabinets (SSC);
- Unified Current Signal Distribution Cabinets (CDC);
- Intermediate Clamp Cabinets (ICC);
- Remote Control Cabinet (RCC).

I/O Details:
AI – Qty 550
DI – Qty 1700
AO – Qty 100
DO – Qty 1000
Acronyms. ESFAS Architecture

ESFAS  Engineered Safety Features Actuation System
UKTS   Unified Software and Hardware System
PCP    Power control panel
RCC    Remote control cabinet
SPC    Signal Processing Cabinet
SPSC   Secondary power supply cabinet
PRV    Pressure relief valve
MC     Multiplication and current
SC     Signaling cabinet
ECR    Emergency Control Room
RTZO   Switchgears cabinets
CSMC   Current signals multiplication cabinet
Radiy’s scope of work.

- **System design**
  - Basic and detail design
  - S/W development
  - Documentation preparation
- **Equipment Manufacturing**
- **Equipment Environmental Qualification and FAT**, mostly in-house
- **Site Acceptance Tests**
- **System installation in situ**
- **System Commissioning**
- **Operational acceptance tests**
- **Documentation update to reflect As Built and As Commissioned status**
- **Training of Engineering, Operation and Maintenance staff**
• Turnkey project. Therefore, Radiy was the Single Point of Contact with the utility for all activities associated with ESFAS refurbishment.

• Responsible for all pre-project and execution activities, from staff selection and qualification to installation and operational tests.
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Schedule of Turnkey Activities. Contract to Operation.

- Contract with NPP
- Factory Acceptance Testing
- On-Site Installation
- Operation
Installation Phase Day 1
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Finished (as installed) system cabinets
Before and After Refurbishment

Before refurbishment. The ESFAS I&C system included 112 control panels.

ESFAS layout after refurbishment. All functionality implemented using 45 RadICS FPGA panels.
• Located in the province of Cordoba, approx. 700 Km NW of the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina
• CANDU (PHWR) began operation in 1983
• Presently in a Life Extension (30 additional years of operation) and power uprate (additional 40 MWe, up to 683 MWe).
Purpose for the Refurbishment of Embalse NPP

30 years additional operation:

- Replacement of reactor components
- **Cater to equipment obsolescence**
- **Trip Coverage**
- **Incorporation of changes resulting from PSA and DSA**

Power Uprate. Additional 40 Mwe.
RPC Radiy Projects for the Embalse NPP in Argentina

• Replacement of Main Control Room and Secondary Control Area Window Annunciators for critical safety systems.

• Shutdown System 2. Addition of Main Heat Transport Pump Motor Speed Measuring and Test Devices
Purpose of the modifications

• Replacement of Main Control Room and Secondary Control Area Window Annunciators for critical safety systems.
  - The originally installed equipment (or a suitable substitute) was no longer offered by the manufacturer.

• Shutdown System 2. Addition of Main Heat Transport Pump Motor Speed Measuring and Test Devices for
  - The implementation of an additional trip parameter, i.e. a reactor trip on low speed of the Main Heat Transport Pumps.
Radiy’s Scope of Work as Contracted by the System Designer, Candu Energy (SNC Lavalin).

• Equipment design per CE’s Technical Specifications, this included:
  o Detail design
  o S/W development
  o Documentation preparation

• Equipment Manufacturing and Testing, this included:
  o PCB, modules and Panel wiring and assembly
  o Equipment Environmental Qualification and Factory Acceptance Tests
General Approach to the Embalse NPP related projects

• Replacement of Main Control Room and Secondary Control Area Window Annunciators for critical safety systems.
  - The standard FPGA based RadICS platform was used to implement this project.
  - RadICS is a SIL3 certified platform under IEC 61508.
  - FFF approach. Direct replacement of old modules with new ones.
  - New modules replicate the functionality of the old ones per client’s request + Diagnostics.
  - No operator re-training was required
  - No changes to the existing electrical mechanical interfaces
  - No changes to the existing Human Machine Interface.
General Approach to the two Embalse related projects Cont…

• Addition of Main Heat Transport Pump Motor Speed Measuring and Test Devices for Shutdown System 2.
  ○ Radiy custom designed the signal processing/test unit using FPGA technology.
  ○ Several of the documents and tests designed to SIL3 qualify Radiy’s equipment were used as a basis for the qualification of the design and equipment
  ○ The SPU was qualified to IEC 61513 Class 1 and supports Category A safety functions

• Both projects were implemented under a CSA Z299.1 quality standard as applicable to critical safety systems.
Window Annunciation. MCR Panels
State Transition Diagram. Window Annunciation.

1. State
   Field Contact: status
   Window: status
   Audible: status

2. Inactive
   Field Contact: any
   Window: OFF
   Audible: OFF

   Loss of Power (LoP) from any State

3. Normal
   Field Contact: Normal
   Window: OFF
   Audible: OFF

4. Operator Resets Alarm

5. Latch Acknowledged Alarm – Horn Silenced
   Field Contact: Normal
   Window: Slow Flash
   Audible: OFF

6. Operator Silences Horn

7. Unacknowledged Alarm
   Field Contact: Abnormal
   Window: Fast Flash
   Audible: Alarm Horn

8. Re-Alarm

9. Operator Acknowledges Alarm

10. Acknowledged Alarm
    Field Contact: Abnormal
    Window: Steady
    Audible: OFF
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Type</th>
<th>Standard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seismic and Thermal Aging</td>
<td>IEEE 344-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Qualification</td>
<td>IEC 60068-2-1 Test A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IEC 60068-2-14 Test N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IEC 60068-2-2 Test B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IEC 60068-2-30 Test D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrostatic Discharge Immunity</td>
<td>IEC 61000-4-2:2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio-frequency and Electromagnetic Field Immunity</td>
<td>IEC 61000-4-3:2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electrical Fast Transient/Burst Immunity</td>
<td>IEC 61000-4-4:2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surge Immunity</td>
<td>IEC 61000-4-5:2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immunity to Conducted Disturbances Induced by Radio-Frequency Fields</td>
<td>IEC 61000-4-6:2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Qualification Tests. Cont..

- Prior to seismic test, all components were thermally aged to an equivalent of 30 years of operation

- Thermal aging was achieved by exposing the equipment to a temperature of 116°C for 198 hours
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Seismic Qualification

![Seismic Qualification Diagram]

- **RRS = 28 g**

2% DAMPING
5% DAMPING

ZERO-PERIOD ACCELERATION (ZPA) = 5g
Annunciator. Seismic Qualification Cont...
## Sunport

### Annunciator. Environmental Qualification Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and unit of measurement</th>
<th>Testing value</th>
<th>Standard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temperature, °C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ lower, not more</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>IEC 60068-2-2:1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>→ upper, not less</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Environmental testing – Part 2: Tests – tests B: Dry heat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed of temperature change, °C/hour (not less)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IEC 60068-2-3:1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative humidity, %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ lower, not more</td>
<td>5 (at 15°C during 2 hours)</td>
<td>Environmental testing – Part 2: Tests – tests C: Damp heat, steady state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ upper, not less</td>
<td>100 (at 50°C during 2 hours)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barometric pressure, kPa</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>→ lower, not more</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ upper, not less</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference type</td>
<td>Interference parameters</td>
<td>Hardness degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air discharge – 15 kV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiated, radio-frequency, electromagnetic field</td>
<td>Electrical field intensity – 10 V/m</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency band – from 26 MHz to 1000 MHz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modulation frequency – 1 kHz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modulation depth (percentage) – 80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In input-output circuits – 2 kV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asymmetrical interference – 4 kV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Addition of a reactor trip on low HTS pump RPM
- Scope of supply includes sensing, signal processing, self diagnostics and test capabilities.
- Design based on the customer Technical Specifications
- Sensor and cable\connector were LOCA qualified
- The SPU was qualified to IEC 61513 Class 1 Category A safety functions

- Converts pump RPMs to an electrical signal as input to the SPU
- The SPU outputs a current proportional to the input signal frequency
- The SPU simulates a pump run-down curve to test availability of the trip function on low RPM and captures the trip point as part of periodic automatic testing.
- Performs self-diagnostics and drives the SPU output to a safe state in case of critical failures
Existing trip parameter to cover loss of HTS Flow at the Embalse NPP
New trip parameter parameter to cover loss of HTS Flow at the Embalse NPP

Diverse
Direct measurement
Simpler design
Higher reliability
Higher resilience to obsolescence
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Standard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation temperature and storage temperature</td>
<td>IEC 60068-2-1 Test A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IEC 60068-2-14 Test N</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thermal ageing</td>
<td>For 30 years of operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Radiation withstand</td>
<td>Requirement in TS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*LOCA withstand</td>
<td>Requirement in TS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
*Only for sensor, cable and connector
RPC Radiy FPGA Product Experience

- Reactor Trip Systems since 2003
- RPCLS since 2004
- ESFAS since 2007
- Cumulative systems > 40
- Cumulative system years > 260
- Cumulative module years > 23000
Key Factors in the success of the projects.

- Meticulously planning of every activity. “Planned the work and worked the plan”

- The adoption of formal process in line with industry standards

- Clearly defined responsibilities and accountability

- Project personnel highly qualified for the tasks assigned to them. Strong team dedication

- Customer involvement throughout project execution

- Reduction in the quantity of equipment, standardization and modularization compressed manufacturing and installation time

- Adoption of FPGA technology simplified design and test processes, kept costs under control and reduced duration of associated activities.
Thanks for your Attention.

Questions?
Safe Failure Fraction. Definition

\[
SFF = \frac{\lambda_{SD} + \lambda_{SU} + \lambda_{DD}}{\lambda_{SD} + \lambda_{SU} + \lambda_{DD} + \lambda_{DU}}
\]

Where:

\(\lambda_{SD}/\lambda_{SU}\): Safe Detected and Safe Undetected trip rates

\(\lambda_{DD}/\lambda_{DU}\): Dangerous Detected and Dangerous Undetected trip rates

SFF is defined as the ratio of the average rate of safe failures plus dangerous detected failures of the subsystem to the total average failure rate of the subsystem. It is defined for a single channel (no redundancy, 1oo1).
Probability of Failure on Demand. Definition.

\[ \text{PFD} = \lambda \text{DU} \times \frac{\text{PTI}}{2} + (\lambda \text{T}) \times \text{MTTR} \]

PFD: Probability of Failure on Demand

\( \lambda \text{T} \): Total trip rate

MTTR: Mean Time to Restore (detect, repair and restart)

PTI: Proof Test Interval (period between tests)
## FMEDA Results for the FSC*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FSC results</th>
<th>61508 Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SIL 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFF</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFD(_{AVG})</td>
<td>9.0 E-4</td>
<td>1 E-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(test interval – 3 y)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 E-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Conservative values wrt altitude
The RadICS platform meets SIL3 requirements in a single (simplex) channel configuration.

The RadICS platform in a multi-channel arrangement would far exceed SIL3 requirements.
Factors contributing to the high reliability of the RadICS platform.

Redundancy coupled with self-testing features. Achieved at three levels, in compliance with Single Failure Criteria (IEEE Std 379-2000):

• **Architecture-level.** Separate, independent divisions/channels feeding a 2oo3 or 3oo4 voting logic.

• **Redundancy built into the hardware for inputs, outputs, and power supplies.**
  - For inputs, signals are transmitted to redundant units.
  - For outputs, 1-out-of-2 to de-energize to a safe state, plus testing of individual switches. Once an unsafe condition is detected all outputs are de-energized.
  - Redundant Power supplies for all RadICS Modules

• **Redundant processing units.**
The RadICS Platform addresses the following CCF related vulnerabilities:

- Electronic Design execution failure, e.g. platform potential failures
- H/W failure, e.g. failure of an FPGA circuit segment
- Corruption of the FPGA Netlist, e.g. failures affecting FPGA loading or EEPROM storage
Diversity to Avoid CCF Cont...

Electronic design failures. Addressed via diversity in technology between the Watchdog (WD) and the modules FPGA

- The system includes a CPLD-based watchdog, separate and technologically diverse from the Module FPGA.

Hardware failures. Addressed by independent and functionally diverse self-test methods.

- Self-tests and diagnostics are executed in independent circuits from the FPGA control logic. Thus no failure propagation between these two.
- The self-test and diagnostics are implemented using a functionally diverse method than the FPGA control logic
- Upon detection of a h/w failure, the module outputs are set to the safe state.
Diversity to Avoid CCF Cont…

Corruption of the FPGA Netlist, during loading or operation may affect both the control logic and the self-test diagnostics.

- Addressed by self testing on initial loading and on a periodic basis during operation.
- The Netlist is checked against a 64-bit CRC independently calculated and stored alongside the FPGA Netlist.
- The Netlist self-test and diagnostics is functionally diverse from the other diagnostics.